Unionism is in crisis. Despite DUP leader Sir Jeffrey Donaldson maintaining that progress has been made on the issue of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the Irish Sea border, offering a “stay of execution” on pulling his ministers out of the power-sharing Executive, a section of loyalist opinion has again expressed its anger against the Protocol by orchestrating sporadic street violence.

Perhaps the real issue which unionists are angry about is the potential – if opinion polls are taken as a benchmark – that the outcome of the next Stormont election, whenever it comes, will see Sinn Féin emerge as the largest party and be entitled to nominate for the post of First Minister. Polls from LucidTalk and the University of Liverpool showed put Sinn Féin’s level of support at between 24% and 25%, with the three main unionist parties trailing (although not by as much in the latter survey).

If these snapshots of public opinion play out in the next Assembly election, unionism again will find itself trailing electorally to nationalism, posing the dilemma: would any of the unionist parties who finished as runner-up to Sinn Féin dare to nominate for the post of deputy First Minister? This could lead to a bigger crisis, affecting much more than unionism.

Spurred on by recent polling, many within the pro-union community are poring over the technicalities of both the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and 2006 St Andrews Agreement to find political loopholes which would effectively keep Sinn Féin out of the First Minister’s post. Unionist anxiety has been heightened with opinion polls suggesting growing support for Sinn Féin south of the border. 

Again, if these polls were replicated in the next Dáil election, would Sinn Féin president Mary Lou McDonald emerge as the next Taoiseach? It’s the prospect of such a scenario that leaves many unionists turning to the rulebook – and potentially hoping to rewrite it.

Revision and renewal

The reality which all the parties on this island must face – as well as the British government in Westminster – is the nature of the processes that reach political agreements. Put bluntly, they lack sufficient focus and are too opaque. What worked for the UUP and SDLP in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and for the DUP and Sinn Féin in the 2006 St Andrews Agreement is no longer relevant, sustainable or workable in 2021. 

Both the 1998 and 2006 agreements worked on the basis of trust between the relevant parties. The crisis facing the institutions in Belfast, as well as the cross-border bodies, is that that trust has evaporated. 

Clearly, trust has evaporated between the political communities across the island, and even including cross-community distrust of the UK Government itself over the outworkings of Brexit and the Protocol. There is also nationalist distrust of unionists, for example, over not implementing ‘Cultural Package’ and embracing the Irish language. Likewise, there is unionist distrust of a more confident nationalism, especially if Sinn Féin does indeed emerge as the largest party in both Stormont and the Dáil in future elections. 

With unionism no longer in the electoral majority in Northern Ireland and the traditional parties of constitutional republicanism, as represented by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, no longer the dominant force in the Republic, a new political context requires a new agreement to help restore trust between the relevant parties. 

Practically, could this trust be achieved by creating a simple political jigsaw piece which would pull together the benefits of various agreements and declarations, such as: 1993 – Downing Street Declaration; 1998 – Good Friday Agreement; 2004 – Leeds Castle peace talks; 2006 – St Andrews Agreement; 2020 – New Decade, New Approach Deal?

Indeed, the current Northern Ireland power-sharing Executive was once dubbed Sunningdale for slow learners. What was the key political ingredient which enabled Brian Faulkner, a former Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and a one-time doyen of the unionist right-wing, along with Gerry Fitt, a founder of the moderate SDLP and a committed socialist, to form the 1973 Sunningdale power-sharing Executive? 

The simple answer is trust between Faulkner and Fitt. Both men had no secret agendas, just a clear desire to work together to build peace in Northern Ireland. 

However, its failure a year later when it collapsed under the weight of the Ulster Workers’ Council street muscle reflects the Sunningdale Executive’s inability to sell that message to the Northern Ireland population, especially in unionism. 

Building trust

This raises a paradoxical question: if we need a revised and renewed settlement to help restore trust, and if we also need trust to make it work, is there sufficient trust at the moment to even begin trying to reach a new, sustainable agreement?

If a new agreement is to work and sustain peace across the island of Ireland, it will require politicians from the various relevant parties to build personal trust among themselves as elected representatives, whilst at the same time bringing their respective electoral bases along with them at the same time and pace. 

Yet another major question needs to be answered: does civil society, that is people, and organisations beyond political parties, have a role to play in building trust? The answer is surely ‘yes’. If trust is otherwise in such short supply amongst politicians themselves, civil society must help them build it by creating the right incentives and conditions. 

There is an urgent need to think ahead to some of the practicalities. Are the conditions likely to be met before or after the next Assembly election in 2022? Probably not. But to maintain stability and protect the overall peace process in Northern Ireland, it’s in the interests of each of the main parties to engage with a new agreement, sooner rather than later.

It’s not as impossible a prospect as some might think. After all, realistically, in order to best promote their different long-term aims, all parties essentially need Northern Ireland as a political entity to ‘work’.