If new Prime Minister Boris Johnson fails to get the Irish backstop axed as part of a Brexit deal, could it trigger the re-emergence of a populist nationalism among the pro-Union community in the form of independence for Northern Ireland? John Coulter examines a way forward for unionism should 31st October bring about Brexit with a backstop. You can follow John on Twitter @JohnAHCoulter.

Northern Ireland’s pro-Union community must vomit at the idea of the Scottish National Party’s dream of an independent Scotland, outside of the UK, but remaining – or re-entering – the European Union.

But many Brexiteers within that pro-Union community would also politically vomit at the idea of a backstop and must be praying that new British Prime Minister Boris Johnson can successfully exit the EU on Halloween Night, minus an Irish backstop.

However, what will unionism’s Plan B be if Boris Johnson is forced to swallow his pride – or even performs a political U-turn – and accepts the implementation of an Irish backstop as part of an exit deal?

Unionist Brexiteers view the backstop as a ploy merely to protect the Irish Republic from the effects of Brexit. Many are hoping for either a ‘no deal’ exit, or a Brexit deal with no backstop.

Either exit scenario may see the South’s economy take a massive financial hit, virtually seeing a return of the dark days of the Celtic Tiger meltdown when the EU had to provide millions of euros to bail out the Republic’s economy.

However, unionist Brexiteers must consider the possibility that a backstop could emerge in some form, ironically leaving the South’s economy in a more stable condition than the North’s in a post-Brexit Ireland.

In these circumstances, an all-island economy along with an inevitable border poll are on the cards. Rather than slide into an all-Ireland republic, should unionism in Northern Ireland prepare its Plan B of being an independent Northern Ireland within the European Union? After all, Northern Ireland – like Scotland – was one of the two regions of the UK which voted ‘remain’ in the referendum.

If Brexit does go ‘pear shaped’ economically for Northern Ireland, could one long-term solution be a Celtic Alliance of the Irish Republic, an independent Northern Ireland, and an independent Scotland, all separate states within the European Union?

The internal Tory election of Johnson as Conservative leader, and ultimately Prime Minister, is like a red flag to the nationalist bull in Scotland.

While the SNP took a bigger hit than expected in Theresa May’s snap Westminster poll in 2017, losing more MPs than it bargained for, much ground was regained electorally for the SNP in May’s European poll where the party gained an MEP and saw an increase in its percentage share of the vote. In 2015, the SNP captured 56 of Scotland’s 59 Westminster seats, losing 21 in 2017. It had expected losses, but anticipated only around a dozen.

However, the main point is that the SNP ‘bounce’ is back and the campaign for a second independence referendum is gathering momentum again.

The key question which the pro-Union community must now address is: Which is the better option if there is a bad Brexit, Irish independence or independence for Northern Ireland? The latter will inevitably see the re-emergence of an Ulster populist nationalism, especially in the ‘Protestant Unionist Loyalist’ (PUL) community if they perceive that the Tories either cannot prevent a united Ireland or see a united Ireland as the price for keeping England and Wales out of the EU.

This should not come as a shock to the pro-Union community as it is not the first time that unionism has flirted with the idea of a doomsday political scenario based around an independent Northern Ireland.

In the 1970s, following the collapse of the Sunningdale power-sharing Executive, when unionism could not produce a viable alternative to that Executive, the then highly influential right-wing Vanguard movement – fronted by the late Bill Craig – toyed with the idea of an independent Ulster.

Vanguard’s most influential period came when it was a pressure group. Its decision to become a political party signalled its eventual demise in less than a decade.

At the same time, Northern Ireland’s then largest paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) – which at that time had not been proscribed – also flirted with the concept of an independent Northern Ireland rather than be forced into an all-island solution post-Sunningdale.

However, the failure of the mid-1970s Northern Ireland Convention and the continued imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster, along with the strong integrationist wing in the then ruling Ulster Unionist Party, pushed notions of independence onto the political back burner.

It would not be until the mid-1980s and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement that Northern Ireland independence would again enter the unionist mindset. It seems the concept of independence is a political knee-jerk to unionism being caught on the hop by a Westminster Government.

In 1985, the then biggest unionist party, the Ulster Unionists, did not see Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s decision to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement with Dublin until it was too late.

Its leader, the late James Molyneaux, had often boasted privately about his special relationship with Mrs Thatcher, but she still went ahead with implementing the Agreement against his wishes. The political penny soon dropped with unionism that Dublin had been accorded its first real say in the running of Northern Ireland affairs since partition in the 1920s.

Again, the knee-jerk of an independent Northern Ireland reared its head with the UDA jumping on that bandwagon.

Also joining the independence train were organisations such as the loyalist working class Ulster Clubs movement (a bid to recreate the anti-Home Rule network of Unionist Clubs which had existed at the turn of the 20th century), the middle class Ulster Movement for Self-Determination (MSD), and even the far-right National Front attempted to cash in on unionist fears.

The Ulster Clubs movement failed to have a long-term influence because it was perceived to have been heavily infiltrated by the loyalist paramilitaries, especially the UDA.

Indeed, as a News Letter reporter in the mid-1980s, I recall covering a loyalist ‘show of strength’ in Ballymena in 1986 to mark the first anniversary of the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. While the event was under the banner of the so-called ‘Loyalist Reaction Force’, it had been staged jointly by the UDA and Ulster Clubs.

The NF’s flirtation with independence was merely a cynical ploy, and ultimately a failed attempt, to gain some kind of political foothold in Northern Ireland. Indeed, even when the Ulster Independence Movement became the Ulster Independence Party, it failed to win any elections.

While the success of the Alliance Party has focused many parties in Northern Ireland on the so-called centre ground of politics, it will be the contents of a future Brexit deal (or lack of one!) which will realistically determine if the populist nationalism of an independent Northern Ireland once more makes it onto the pro-Union negotiating table, or is merely dismissed as another example of ‘Project Fear’ in Ireland.

Vanguard flag