If you asked someone what the worst civilizational disaster was of the 20thcentury, they would likely say one of the World Wars. And these are certainly valid suggestions given the huge losses of life and far-reaching consequences of the two conflicts.

Mao’s Great Famine by Frank Dikötter

An answer you are less likely to hear is the Great Leap Forward. This was the economic plan implemented between 1958-1962 by Chairman Mao Zedong to rapidly industrialise China through mass collectivisation of land and coercive relocation of workers into communes. The result was a famine that is unparalleled in human history.

This event gets comparatively little attention to other crimes against humanity, yet the death toll was larger than all the atrocities of Hitler, Stalin, Franco, Pol Pot and Mussolini combined.

Frank Dikötter, Chair Professor of Humanities at the University of Hong Kong, examines this catastrophe in the second book of his three-part series on China under communism, Mao’s Great Famine.

 

Not a ‘great leap forward’

Straight off the bat, Dikötter’s choice of title reveals one of the core theses of the book: the ‘Great Leap Forward’ was not progressive. It was a famine, a famine that was chiefly the fault of Chairman Mao himself. Dikötter makes this point clear throughout the book. While it’s certainly true that the Chairman was enabled by a host of self-interested bureaucrats and fawning devotees, this doesn’t change the fact that he was the primary architect of this radical economic strategy. Hence, in Dikötter’s opinion, Mao “bears the main responsibility for the catastrophe that followed.”

After the preface, the book provides a concise chronology summarising the key events of the famine, with the next two chapters going into much greater more detail in a narrative prose.

Emboldened by the death of Stalin and the opportunity to become the torchbearer of socialism, Mao authorised several major water projects in late 1957 early 1958, launching the Great Leap Forward. Even from the beginning of the famine, Mao and higher party elites knew their policies were not working. Despite being the creator of the Great Leap Forward, when the reports of famine, inefficiency and abuse came back, Mao blamed everyone but himself for its failures. When internal criticism threatened his leadership, he instigated political purges and witch-hunts for “rightist elements.”

Prior to and throughout the famine, Mao effectively created a personality cult around himself. He achieved this by psychologically torturing his underlings mainly through ritual public humiliations and turning them into submissive yes-men. For those who were more resilient or too influential to bully, he simply removed them. Once he made enough examples, the rest of the Party fell in line.

The author shows how Mao’s narcissism and paranoia derailed any possibility to divert the unfolding disaster. Specifically, Mao’s obsession over his historical legacy and fear that he would be denounced after his death like Stalin, were the main driving forces behind his megalomania. Dikötter points out that Mao, amongst a variety of personality flaws, was “above all, insensitive to human loss.”

For those who enjoy political intrigue these opening chapters will be a rewarding section of the book. Dikötter not only effectively explains the political context but also skilfully illustrates the different personalities and how they interacted with each other. He describes numerous political and personal dramas: the mutually contemptuous relations with the Soviet Union, the unbearably tense party meetings, the political witch-hunts, the desperate attempts of the government elites to appease Mao’s ego, and the Party’s realisation of what they had done. These compelling narratives gives the reader an insight into the character of Mao and his regime. This additionally will help give an early explanation as to way the Great Leap Forward went as badly as it did.

 

The legacy

Following this overview, the author methodically details the consequences of the Great Leap Forward economically and environmentally. In almost every conceivable area Mao’s policies caused chronic inefficiency, largescale destruction and death. As a result of mass collectivisation production quality cratered, workplace discipline disappeared, corruption became endemic, pointless construction projects wasted both money and lives, machinery constantly broke down from lack of maintenance, wastefulness and apathy became the standard, and capital spending spiralled out of control.

Two featured examples showcase the destructiveness and surrealness of the Great Leap Forward.

Hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of buildings were torn down and used as fertiliser. As Dikötter puts it, “the Great Leap Forward constitutes, by far, the greatest demolition of property in human history.” This was in addition to homes being dismantled for scrap metal, fuel and even food as people ate the straw from their thatched roofs. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of houses in China were destroyed between 1958 and 1962.

Another bizarre episode of was Mao’s decree to eliminate all sparrows, a front in his “war against nature.” Millions of sparrows were killed across the country as Mao believed they would eat the grain seeds and reduce crop yields. This spectacularly backfired. With no sparrows to eat insects, mass swarms of grasshoppers and locusts destroyed thousands of hectares of crops.

These are just two instances from a catalogue of mistakes that made an already dire situation much worse.

The next chapter discusses how people went about surviving the famine. Central planning failed to eliminate the barter economy and ironically the system would have likely completely collapsed if not for these informal black markets. Dikötter notes that, “One of the many paradoxes of the planned economy, therefore was that everybody traded.”

Another irony was that how communist policies enabled the most ruthless forms of self-interest. Corruption and nepotism were the only way to get ahead and those in privileged positions within the government exploited their status for their own gain, often beyond what was necessary for survival, “Petty power corrupted petty people.” Black markets would facilitate the sale of anything, even parents selling their children.

As the famine proceeded, desperation often erupted into violence. Bands of farmers would raid government grain silos or attack rival communes. Arson was frequently employed as a means of protest against government seizures of crops and property. Though direct confrontation with the government was rare as citizens were simply too weak to put up a serious challenge to the regime.

 

Hypocritical and irrational

The inherent hypocrisy and irrationally of the Maoist system is on full display here. While the previous chapter illustrated the economic follies of communism, this section presents the psychological and sociological counterevidence against it. The Party promised a worker’s utopia free from greed and selfishness but Dikötter shows that its policies perversely brought out the worst in people.

The author does not pull any punches. Earlier in the book, while avoiding coming off as harsh, he plainly says that the Chinese people were not merely victims. Everyone, regardless of status, consistently manipulated the system to get by, “virtually everybody, from top to bottom, subverted the system of distribution.” As the circumstances became more extreme, ordinary people were forced to make “grim moral compromises.” Social cohesion and traditional ethical norms eroded as a result. Trivial feuds escalated and underlying resentments boiled over as people struggled against their neighbours, friends and even family members to survive.

Readers will be faced with the dark reality of surviving a famine, further underscoring the true horror of the Great Leap Forward. A pithy observation by the authors captures this unpleasant truth, “In times of famine one person’s gain was another’s loss.”

In the chapter focusing on the most vulnerable victims, mainly women, children and the elderly, Dikötter explains how the specific ways these groups were uniquely victimised in the Great Leap Forward. In a similar manner to the last chapter, this segment sheds light on the unsettling affects chronic hunger and fear have on the moral fabric of a population.

Children died in disproportionate numbers during the famine. Many were placed in commune nurseries as their parents worked. Neglect and abuse became widespread as the famine worsened. In addition, many children were simply abandoned by their parents as they realised they couldn’t continue to feed them. The elderly suffered in a similar manner as they were viewed as a burden. Regardless of family bonds, the elderly were largely ignored and abused as “starvation tested every tie to the limit.”

The book also highlights that although communism promised female liberation from patriarchal oppression, the collectivisation of society made women’s lives worse. In particular, sexual assault and rape became increasingly common. Conventional moral standards had deteriorated, and many individuals held positions of power with little to no accountability. In spite of the numerous threats and challenges they faced Dikötter states women were very good at “devising everyday strategies of survival.” In his opinion it was children and the elderly who were the worse affected by the famine, both directly and indirectly.

 

The terror

The penultimate chapter focuses on the various ways people died during the Great Leap Forward. While starvation is obviously the primary cause of death in a famine, Dikötter doesn’t concentrate on that in this section. Rather he focuses on the other ways people died, capturing important realities that are frequently overlooked. The feature that stands out the most is the systemic violence and terror that was utilised to carry out Mao’s vision, something that can be easily eclipsed but is crucially important to recognise.

Dikötter has himself noted in interviews that it is understandable to focus on the mass starvation, as that’s a famine’s defining trait. However, the author highlights how the famine wouldn’t have been possible if not for the threat of and use of violence by the government.

The Party ultimately relied on armed militias to enforce its policies and quash any kind of dissent, with the viciousness of the coercion and punishments escalating as the population became more brutalised and demoralised. It’s estimated that at least 2.5 million people were shot, beaten or tortured to death during this period. This isn’t even included those who died from being intentionally denied food, mistreatment in Gulags (Laogai) or the shockingly high number of people who took their lives following public humiliations. Many were killed for completely trivial reasons, often to satisfy the frustration and ambition of vindictive cadres who were incentivised to use whatever means necessary to reach ludicrous production quotas.

This is arguably the most important part of the book. It illustrates two very important things. Firstly, how truly horrific a famine is and what it pushes otherwise decent people to do. Secondly, Dikötter shows in this chapter what lengths the communist government was willing to go to enforce its policies and maintain its authority. It provides a stark warning against utopian thinking and unrestrained power.

The final chapter fittingly addresses the final tally of the famine.

Given the sheer scale of this calamity and the unreliable documentation of deaths, collecting the data for this book was undoubtedly a difficult task. Furthermore, the Chinese government has not been forthcoming with certain archival records and even quashed the publication of internal reports on the famine. Dikötter’s navigation of these problems displays dedication and skill as a scholar.

He lays out the various estimates that experts have proposed as the probable final death toll of the Great Leap Forward. During the 80’s several historians estimated tallies ranging from between 23 to 38 million. More recent estimates have placed the final number as significantly higher and Dikötter says that based on his own research for the book at least45 million people died prematurely as a result of the famine. Other historians, including Chinese researchers, have put the death toll as high as 50 to 60 million. But unfortunately, Dikötter acknowledges that the true figure will likely never be known.

 

The contribution of the book

As for criticisms, this book won the prestigious 2011 Samuel Johnson Prize for good reason, so there is very little to fault in Dikötter’s work. A minor subjective critique is that the sections dealing with monetary statistics could be quite dry but if you’re economically minded you may well find this fascinating. A potential recommendation for additional content could be a direct rebuttal to claims that famine was mainly caused by natural disasters and not the incompetence of the government. However, in many ways it could be argued that the entire book is a rebuttal to such excuses.

Overall, Mao’s Great Famineis an extraordinary piece of analysis which history enthusiasts will find edifying and captivating. The scholarship and intellectual authority backing the information presented is beyond reproach.

Not only does the author provide an informative outline of the Great Leap Forward it also highlights the details that could get lose in a purely statistical analysis. Rather than just listing census data, Dikötter reveals the human stories behind the numbers as well as uncomfortable truths about human nature. From the denial and panic amongst the party members, the desperation of ordinary citizens and the callousness of the cadre enforcers, this book illustrates the true horror of famine and tyranny.

Historical value aside, at the very least reading this book will give readers the necessary rhetorical ammunition to challenge the alarming yet sadly pervasive justifications of Maoism. It ends on somewhat of a cliff-hanger when Dikötter recounts several heated public confrontations between Mao and the Head of State, Liu Shaoqi, one of the few party members who dared openly criticise the Great Leap Forward.

As the terrible consequences of the Mao’s project became undeniable, Lui’s criticism became more pointed and vocal (though he was careful to never directly blame the Chairman as this would be signing his own death warrant). This polemic culminated at a massive party meeting in January 1962 where Liu described the famine as a man-made disaster in front of thousands of party members and Mao himself. As much as this galled Mao, in the following months he eventually relented and allowed for “economic readjustment.”

Dikötter points out that this was likely the point Mao identified Liu as a threat to his rule and legacy, “the Chairman was now convinced that he had found his Khrushchev, the servant who had denounced his master Stalin.” This suspicion of Liu set in motion Mao’s next historical project and what would be his ploy to regain his political standing. The closing pages set the reader up for Dikötter’s next instalment on the tragic history of communist China: the Cultural Revolution.

 

Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-62 by Frank Dikötter (2011) is published by Bloomsbury Paperbacks. Watch the author discuss his book here: