“Finishing second in the Olympics gets you silver. Finishing second in politics gets you oblivion.” Richard Nixon was soon to find out that there were other ways of encountering oblivion than merely finishing second. But his point, nonetheless, is important. Political parties set out to win. When they win, they become relevant. And when they can persuade voters that they are still relevant, they tend to win.

In announcing his Budget this week, George Osborne fired the starting gun of the 2015 General Election campaign. Some may have found it too timid, too safe. Others may dismiss it outright and maintain that austerity has held Britain back. Whatever you think of the Budget and the government’s handing of the economy, the Budget was all part of a broader strategic calculation. The Conservatives want to persuade voters that their plan has worked, and so they deserve to be given the chance to carry on. Labour, in turn, want voters to imagine that things would be even better had they been in power, and so deserve the chance to take over.

As voters try to imagine their own vision of the future of Britain, both parties will set out establish their relevance as deliverers of that vision. In doing so, both will face a more straightforward task than the Liberal Democrats.

It’s a vision that will unsurprisingly be dominated by the economy in an election campaign that promises to be close, exciting, and consequential. It is competition on the economy according to which the election will be won and lost.

But not in Northern Ireland, of course.

Here, competition will be based on anything but public policy. We should not be surprised. Historically, the Northern Ireland party system has been effectively detached from the broader Westminster party system since partition. As a result, electoral debate in parliamentary elections is necessarily constricted. Our Westminster elections have never been about rewarding or punishing a government, or giving the opposition party a chance; rather, it’s been about sending eighteen MPs to act as representatives of Northern Ireland constituencies. No doubt, representation is an important function of Parliament.

But Northern Ireland’s detachment from the competitive race occurring in the rest of the UK undermines the effectiveness of our representation. We are reminded of this reality by the exclusion of Northern Ireland parties from the upcoming seven-way leaders’ debate. The broadcasters’ justification is not, it should be said, entirely logical, especially given the inclusion of the SNP and Plaid Cymru. But what cannot be disputed is that the Northern Ireland parties are largely irrelevant to the wider political debate in the UK.

It would be unfair to lay all the blame with Northern Ireland’s parties themselves. Northern Ireland does have its own particular history, and the major parties of Great Britain have chosen not to stand, with the recent exception of the Conservatives in recent years. But their uphill struggle underlines just how detached the Northern Ireland system has become from the broader Westminster system.

Local parties could, however, make choices that demonstrate their desire to be relevant to contemporary politics. Instead, we saw precisely the opposite this week. The electoral pact announced by the DUP and UUP reinforces the ethno-national nature of competition of Northern Ireland politics, ensuring that the election is about an issue that isn’t even up for debate. At best, it represents a flawed strategic calculation, especially for the UUP. At worst, it means that May’s election will amount to little more than a sectarian headcount.

Let’s start with the best-case scenario. It is perhaps generous to even call it a strategic calculation, because that implies that it contains strategy and long-term calculation. Instead, it is little more than a short-term tactical manoeuvre. Despite being the obvious loser in the negotiated outcome, the UUP is banking on winning in Fermanagh and South Tyrone and, thus, being able to prove its critics wrong. It does have a chance of taking the constituency in May. But what is the broader logic? If you are a UUP voter in a constituency other than the four with a Unionist pact in place, you are now much more likely to do one of two things: vote for the DUP, or not at all.

The reasoning is simple. The DUP and UUP have effectively told the electorate that there is nothing fundamental that differentiates them. They are largely one and the same. This is not just about four constituencies. It is about all eighteen, even if the UUP does not fully appear to appreciate this. A rational UUP voter will recognise that the UUP is indistinguishable from the DUP, and recognise that the latter overwhelmingly the dominant partner. By a ‘survival of the fittest’ logic, the rational UUP voter will opt for the DUP. The alternative scenario is that a rational UUP voter will recognise that because there is nothing to differentiate the UUP from the DUP, it is most rational to stay at home. If there’s no real choice, there’s no real decision to be made.

It’s poor party strategy (for the UUP), and extremely poor for democratic competition. It leaves the UUP staring into oblivion. We’ve been saying this for some time now, of course. But the passage of time makes it no less true. As Alex Kane would say, the UUP has failed to prove its relevance. Even if it manages to pull off a victory in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, such a victory will mask a very serious existential crisis.

Let’s now turn to the worst aspect of this pact. Peter Robinson and Mike Nesbitt have been at pains to say that it has nothing to do with sectarianism. Instead, it’s about doing what’s best for Unionism: strengthening its representation at Westminster. But what is ‘Unionism’? If it were defined in any terms other than ethnic, there would certainly be no need for electoral pacts. Rather than strengthening Unionism, ‘unity’ is actually undermining it.