As we approach the twentieth anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, it’s as good an opportunity as any to reflect on where we have come over the last two decades and where we’re going now.

Over the last few days, prominent Brexiteers have joined the discussion. Owen Paterson, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, raised eyebrows when he retweeted an article by Ruth Dudley-Edwards claiming the Agreement “has outlived its use.” Daniel Hannan took to his column in the Daily Telegraph to argue that “the Good Friday Agreement has failed.” The Labour MP Kate Hoey agreed, calling for “a cold, rational look” at the “unsustainable” settlement.

Their interventions have certainly ruffled feathers, to say the least. Tánaiste Simon Coveney issued a pointed response:

The truth is that they all have a point.

The Good Friday Agreement is not perfect. If it were, then today we would probably have a functioning Assembly and Executive in Northern Ireland. We haven’t had either for the last 13 months in part because of a lack of political will to make the institutions work, but at the same time we cannot pretend that their institutional design was flawless to begin with.

Northern Ireland’s system of government presented (and presents) legitimate questions when it comes to the quality of democracy on offer. Is there too much emphasis on parties sharing power and not enough on holding them to account for the way in which they exercise power? Does the system simply entrench unionist and nationalist divisions, rather than providing incentives for politicians to reach beyond their comfort zones? And does the nature of the system too often lead to negotiation between political parties behind closed doors, leaving ordinary citizens feeling apathetic and detached from the entire process?

These are all perfectly legitimate questions. Journalists, academics, and ordinary citizens have been asking them for years, together with more than a few local politicians. They all relate to ‘Strand One’ issues. That’s technical-speak for the part of the Agreement that sets out how Northern Ireland’s devolved government is supposed to work. If Owen Paterson, Daniel Hannan and Kate Hoey were referring to this part of the Agreement, it’s hard to deny that they have a point. Clearly, devolved government is not working in the way that it should be.

However, as you might guess, ‘Strand One’ implies that there are other strands to the Good Friday Agreement. Strand Two deals with north-south cooperation, between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; Strand Three deals with east-west cooperation, between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. And then there are sections on rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity; decommissioning; security; policing and justice; and prisoners.

To make things more complicated, it is not just an agreement between the various political parties within Northern Ireland; it is also an international agreement between the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. This means that, internally, it’s up to the political parties of Northern Ireland to make it work, but the British and Irish governments also affirmed their “solemn commitment to support, and where appropriate implement, the provisions of the Multi-Party Agreement.”

This is where the present context matters. The UK and Ireland have both been members of the European Union. Now that one is leaving, there have been plenty of questions as to whether the provisions – and spirit – of the Agreement can still be fully realised. These provisions aren’t the ‘Strand One’ elements of institutional design within Northern Ireland; they relate to the provisions on rights, citizenship and the broader sets of relationships across these islands. On these there are much greater sensitivities.

It’s no secret that the Irish border poses perhaps the biggest single headache in Brexit negotiations. Both sides of the table have insisted that a hard border would be unthinkable, and both the British and Irish governments have reaffirmed their obligations under the Good Friday Agreement. Given the timing of recent criticisms, it’s understandable for people to be suspicious as to the motives of those talking down the Agreement. It would be a lot easier to dismiss the significance of the Irish border issue if the legitimacy of the document underpinning Northern Ireland’s constitutional architecture was in any doubt.

For all its imperfections, the Good Friday Agreement was endorsed by 71% of voters in Northern Ireland in 1998 (on a turnout of 81%), and by 94% of voters in the Republic of Ireland. In Great Britain, it was the product of cross-party consensus involving heavy lifting by both the Major and Blair governments. As far as democratic legitimacy goes, that was quite a starting point for the Agreement.

But the Agreement itself wasn’t the end point. Twenty years later, it’s important to say that. Its sustained legitimacy depends not on the citation of a referendum result, but on politicians successfully operating the political system to make a positive difference to people’s lives in Northern Ireland. When that fails to be the case, constructive reforms should be up for discussion. Crucially, however, any proposed changes must be properly deliberated and enjoy a broad degree of consensus within Northern Ireland before being seriously considered. To put it another way, this means that they must not be imposed unilaterally or serve any ulterior agenda.

“It’s a significant accomplishment, but I don’t think anyone should be under the illusion that the problems of Northern Ireland have been solved with this one act,” warned Senator George Mitchell when the Good Friday Agreement was signed some 20 years ago.

In 2018, as in 1998, plenty of problems remain. Let’s make sure that more effort goes into solving them than exploiting them.

Also published on Medium.